Page 155 - JOURNAL OF LIBRARY SCIENCE IN CHINA 2018 Vol. 44

154 Journal of Library Science in China, Vol.10, 2018

Essentially, the free admission policy is a policy design that promotes work development by
financial distribution. This process of distribution “is both a political process and an economic
process, which will lead to the redistribution of rights between different interest groups” (Wei,
2005). It will break the original balance of interests and create a new one, so it will encounter
the resistance to policy implementation. The “funding subsidy” of the free admission policy is
an internal adjustment to the original sources and structures of the public libraries. For example,
the scope of subsidy for public libraries is the license fee, verification fee, self-study room usage
fee, electronic reading room access fee, storage fee and the reduction of charges for non-basic
services, so this subsidy policy is a “benefit-allocated policy” rather than a “ benefit-based policy”
(Ma, 2012). In the absence of an increase in the total amount of benefits, library readers will be
the beneficiaries of the free admission policy, while the interests of public libraries and local
governments may be damaged, thus may evolve into potential policy resistance.
In order to reduce the resistance of policy implementation and promote the free admission policy
quickly and comprehensively, the policymakers have chosen a relatively simple, straightforward,
effective policy scheme, which is conducting differentiated subsidies and incentives by dividing
the east, central, west regions, and provincial, municipal, county levels. From the realistic policy
practice, this scheme has reached the original intention of policymakers to act quickly, spreadfully,
implement strongly. However, after the initial effect of the policy appears, it is necessary to carry
out timely policy optimization and adjustment, otherwise it will encounter “the principle of the
reduction of public policy effects” (Peters & van Nispen, 2006). R. J. Intveld believes that in the
dynamic policy process, as the policy is implemented, the positive effects that are consciously
predictable will gradually shrink, while the negative effects that are unconscious or unseen in the
early stages of policy design will become more and more significant (Peters & van Nispen, 2006).
The above analysis that the contradiction between the rapid increase of public library services after
free admission and the constant subsidy, the same standard subsidies for venues of different scales
under the same administrative level, and the lack of supervision and evaluation mechanism of free
admission policy. All these problems are the demonstration that the optimization adjustment of free
admission policy is not timely and not in place.
2) The division of cultural powers and expenditure responsibilities between central and local
is indeterminate, the responsibility of expenditure is not matched with the financial capacity,
and the policy costs are higher than the benefits. All of above affect the implementation of local
apportionment of funds.
The fundamental reason for restricting the optimization of the financial guarantee mechanism for
cultural field has always been the indeterminate division of powers and expenditure responsibilities
between central and local. China’s five-level administrative structure system has the characteristics
of “higher and lower level counterpart, isomorphic responsibility”. The powers owned by local
governments are almost all extensions and duplication of the central government or higher-level
government. The powers of the higher level government relies on the bureaucratic structure of the